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STATUTORY GOOD-FAITH IMMUNITY FOR GOVERNMENT 
PHYSICIANS: COGENT POLICY OR A DENIAL OF JUSTICE? 
Andrew Flavelle Martin* 
Recent events such as the SARS outbreak and the controversy over pediatric forensic  
pathology in Ontario have increased awareness and scrutiny of physicians employed by the 
government, including medical officers of health, coroners, and pathologists. At common law, 
physicians are held to a standard of care that can be summarized as reasonable professional 
competence. Statutory provisions effectively neutralize this standard of care for government 
physicians by providing civil immunity so long as they act in “good faith”. The appropriate-
ness of this protection from civil liability is assessed in this paper.  
The author argues that statutory good-faith immunity is inconsistent with the require-
ments that these positions be held by licensed doctors; indeed, it is a common provision of  
legislation for government employees that is not appropriate to the special case of government 
physicians. The Ontario statutory and case law is canvassed in relation to the powers and  
duties of coroners, forensic pathologists, and medical officers of health. It is then demonstrat-
ed that this statutory good-faith immunity is applied to the vast majority of public actors in  
Ontario. Within this context, the historic and current policy rationales for the immunity are 
assessed with reference to the recent judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada and the  
Ontario Court of Appeal establishing a tort of negligent investigation by police. The author 
then assesses how the common law of tort would apply to government physicians if these  
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“To deny a remedy in tort is, quite literally, to deny justice.” 
- The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada1 
INTRODUCTION 
Events of recent years have increased both public awareness and political scrutiny of the 
work of physicians performing public functions. In 2003, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respira-
tory Syndrome (“SARS”) illustrated the importance of public health as a medical discipline.2 In 
response to the SARS experience, the federal government commissioned an advisory committee 
led by Dr. David Naylor, and the Ontario government appointed a commission under Justice 
Archie Campbell, to examine the handling of SARS and make recommendations to strengthen 
public health programs and policy.3 Not long after SARS, death investigation—the discipline of 
coroners and forensic pathologists—attracted attention. In April 2007, the Office of the Chief 
Coroner for Ontario publicly confirmed serious problems with the work of once-renowned pedi-
atric forensic pathologist Dr. Charles Smith.4 The government chose Justice Stephen Goudge of 
the Ontario Court of Appeal to lead a public inquiry that would “conduct a systemic review … in 
order to make recommendations to restore and enhance public confidence in pediatric forensic 
pathology in Ontario and its future use in investigations and criminal proceedings.”5 A span of a 
few years had brought public examinations of three different kinds of government physicians: 
medical officers of health, coroners, and forensic pathologists. 
Despite the merits of these examinations, a major issue remains unaddressed. The three re-
ports were fundamentally concerned with the quality of public health and death investigation, 
two areas in which physicians play crucial roles. As a generalization, “[c]ivil liability is widely 
used in Canada as a mechanism to ensure quality of health services.”6 However, none of the 
                                                 
 1  Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129 at 
para. 35, 285 D.L.R. (4th) 620, aff‟g (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 481, 259 D.L.R. (4th) 676 (C.A.) [Hill (S.C.C.) cited 
to S.C.R.; Hill (C.A.) cited to O.R.].  
 2  See e.g. Nola M. Ries, “Quarantine and the Law: The 2003 SARS Experience in Canada: A New Disease 
Calls on Old Public Health Tools” (2005) 43 Alta. L. Rev. 529; Roxana Salehi & S. Harris Ali, “The Social and 
Political Context of Disease Outbreaks: The Case of SARS in Toronto” (2006) 32 Canadian Pub. Pol‟y 373. 
 3  National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, Learning from SARS: The Renewal of Pub-
lic Health in Canada (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2003) (Chair: Dr. David Naylor), online: Public Health Agency 
of Canada <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/sars-sras/pdf/sars-e.pdf> [Naylor Report]; Commission to 
Investigate the Introduction and Spread of SARS in Ontario, Final Report (Toronto: Queen‟s Printer for On-
tario, 2006) (Commissioner: Justice Archie Campbell), online: Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term 
Care <http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/ministry_reports/campbell06/online_rep/ 
index.html> [Campbell Report].  
 4  Office of the Chief Coroner, Backgrounder: Public Announcement of Review of Criminally Suspicious 
and Homicide Cases Where Dr. Charles Smith Conducted Autopsies or Provided Opinions (Toronto: Ministry 
of Community Safety and Correctional Services, 2007), online: Legislative Library, Legislative Assembly of 
Ontario <http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/17000/272655.pdf> [Coroner, “Backgrounder”]. 
 5  Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario, online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/>; Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology 
in Ontario Report (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 2008) (Commissioner: the Honour-
able Stephen T. Goudge), online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General <http://www. 
attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/report/index.html> [Goudge Report]; O.C. 826/2007 at 2-3 
(Order in Council establishing the Goudge Inquiry), in Goudge Report, vol. 4 at 678-79, online: Ontario Min-
istry of the Attorney General <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/news/2007/20070425-pi-
oic-en.pdf>. 
 6  Tracey Epps, “Regulation of Health Care Professionals” in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Col-
leen Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3d ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2007) 69 at 75, 
citing M.J. Trebilcock, D. Dewees & D. Duff, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts Seri-
ously (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 96. 
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three reports questioned in any detail the dramatic extent to which government physicians, spe-
cifically medical officers of health, coroners, and forensic pathologists, are protected from civil 
liability.7 At common law, the standard of care that applies to doctors is “that degree of care and 
skill which could reasonably be expected of a normal, prudent practitioner of the same experi-
ence and standing.”8 Legislation effectively lowers this standard by providing civil immunity to 
government physicians so long as they act in “good faith”. Thus, doctors with duties and powers 
arguably much greater than a typical practitioner are subject to a much lower standard of care.  
This reduced liability of government physicians is a critical public policy issue. Ultimately at 
stake are the responsibility of government physicians to the public and the responsibility of the 
governments that employ them. These go to the fundamental core of public law, the relationship 
between the individual and the state. Ideally the state and its servants will not harm the individ-
ual. Indeed, the Naylor Report, the SARS Commission, and the Goudge Inquiry focused on how 
to prevent or at least reduce that harm. Nonetheless, the question remains: when such harm 
does occur, who should bear the cost? 
In this paper, I argue that statutory good-faith immunity for government physicians is  
fundamentally inconsistent with the expectation of professional competence by licensed doctors. 
Instead, it is a relatively standard legislative provision that is not appropriate in the particular 
contexts of death investigation and public health. While this issue is not unique to Ontario, that 
province will be the primary focus because the SARS and Charles Smith affairs were centred 
there.  
This argument will proceed in four parts. First, the relevant statutory and case law in Ontario 
will be canvassed. I will consider the powers, duties, and good-faith immunity provisions, first of 
coroners and forensic pathologists, and then of medical officers of health. I will also survey the 
immunities granted to physicians at large corresponding to general duties imposed by statute. 
The second part argues that the Ontario immunity provisions for government physicians are 
more likely to be an application of standard practice than the result of conscious consideration of 
the special context of government physicians. I begin by demonstrating the ubiquity of similar 
provisions among Ontario statutes. I then consider the legislative history of the acts governing 
coroners, forensic pathologists, and medical officers of health. The third part evaluates the  
historical and current policy rationales for good-faith immunity provisions. I explain how paral-
lel jurisprudence from the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada, recogniz-
ing the tort of negligent investigation by police, can be harnessed to reject these rationales. The 
fourth part considers how the common law of tort liability would apply to government physicians 
in the absence of statutory immunity.  
                                                 
 7  The Naylor Report, supra note 3 does not consider this issue. The second interim report of the SARS 
Commission considers it very briefly and concludes that the protection should be extended to additional  
actors in the public health system: Campbell Report, supra note 3, vol. 5, at 19, 65-66, 69. The issue was also 
addressed briefly in a research paper prepared by Professor Lorne Sossin for the Goudge Inquiry, Account-
ability and Oversight for Death Investigations in Ontario (Toronto: Goudge Inquiry, 2008) at 33-34, online: 
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/ 
goudge/policy_research/pdf/Sossin_Accountability-and-Oversight.pdf>. Professor Sossin‟s analysis will be 
discussed below. While Commissioner Goudge recommended several legislative amendments, he did not ad-
dress the provision that provides immunity from civil liability: Goudge Report, supra note 5, vol. 3 at 288, 
309-12, 338-39 (Recommendations 1, 12-14, 17, 38). The issue of good-faith immunity in the context of coro-
ners has recently been raised by at least one journalist: Natalie Alcoba, “Picking up the Pieces: Those Whose 
Lives Were Shattered by Charles Smith Have Little Recourse” National Post (12 December 2009) A14. 
 8  Crits and Crits v. Sylvester et al., [1956] O.R. 132 at 143, 1 D.L.R. (2d) 502 (C.A.) [Crits (C.A.) cited to 
O.R.], aff‟d [1956] S.C.R. 991, 5 D.L.R. (2d) 601, quoted in Ellen I. Picard & Gerald B. Robertson, Legal Liabil-
ity of Doctors and Hospitals in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson, 2007) at 225 (as “[t]he classic state-
ment”).  




STATUTORY GOOD-FAITH IMMUNITY FOR PHYSICIANS 
I begin by canvassing the law on statutory immunity for physicians, primarily in Ontario. I 
will first consider coroners and forensic pathologists and then medical officers of health. In each 
case, I will survey the extensive powers and duties involved as well as the immunity provisions. I 
then provide some broader context by examining the major duties imposed by statute on physi-
cians at large and the extent to which corresponding immunity is given.  
A. Coroners and Forensic Pathologists 
Coroners in Ontario are physicians with substantial duties and powers. A coroner must be a 
“legally qualified medical practitione[r],” both upon appointment and in order to keep the posi-
tion.9 Indeed, the Coroners Act imposes a duty on the College of Physicians and Surgeons of  
Ontario to inform the Chief Coroner if any coroner ceases to hold a valid medical licence.10  
Coroners investigate virtually all unnatural deaths, and deaths in various institutions, in order to 
establish “how … when … where … and by what means the deceased came by his or her death.”11 
In order to do so, coroners have broad powers of entry, search, and seizure.12 Obstruction of a 
coroner is an offence punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.13 As part of an investigation, a 
coroner can commission an autopsy or other tests.14 These tests and investigations can be critical 
evidence in criminal prosecutions. Coroners can order inquests “in the public interest,” at which 
any evidence or person can be summoned.15 
The forensic pathologist performs a discrete complementary role to that of the coroner.  
Under the Coroners Act, pathologists are required to be physicians with specializations in  
pathology.16 Parallel to the provision concerning coroners, the Act imposes a duty on the College 
of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario to notify the Chief Forensic Pathologist if a pathologist is 
no longer in good standing.17 The pathologist has a duty to perform an autopsy where one is  
ordered by a coroner.18 This obligation comes with a broad power of entry, not only of places 
where the body is, but also of places from which the pathologist believes (on reasonable and 
probable grounds) the body has been removed.19 Moreover, this power can be exercised not only 
where a warrant for the autopsy has been issued by the coroner, but also in the absence of a war-
rant where the pathologist reasonably believes such a warrant will be issued.20 
                                                 
 9  Coroners Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.37, s. 3 (The Coroners Amendment Act, 2009, S.O. 2009, c. 15,  
received royal assent on 5 June 2009. And all sections but s. 4 came into force on 27 July, 2009 and s. 4 came 
into force on 16 December 2010.). The Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F, s. 87 provides that in 
Ontario legislation, “legally qualified medical practitioner” and similar terms “mean a member of the College 
of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario”. 
 10  Coroners Act, ibid., s. 3(3).  
 11  Ibid., ss. 10, 15, 31(1). 
 12  Ibid., s. 16.  
 13  Ibid., ss. 16(6), 55.  
 14  Ibid., s. 28.  
 15  Ibid., ss. 20, 40. See also ss. 22.1, 26, 27, 30-52. As will be discussed further below, the role of a coro-
ner at a coroner‟s inquest is a quasi-judicial function that would not attract liability in negligence at common 
law. 
 16  Ibid., s. 1(1) (This definition of pathologist, like every mention of the term “pathologist” in the Act, was 
absent prior to the Coroners Amendment Act, 2009, supra note 9). 
 17  Ibid., s. 7.1(2). 
 18  Ibid., s. 28(1), (3). 
 19  Ibid., s. 28(4). 
 20  Ibid. 
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While these powers of coroners and forensic pathologists are extensive, the corresponding  
liability is minimal. Section 53 of the Coroners Act provides as follows:  
No action or other proceeding shall be instituted against any person exercising a 
power or performing a duty under this Act for any act done in good faith in the execution 
or intended execution of any such power or duty or for any alleged neglect or default in the 
execution in good faith of any such power or duty.21 
It is critically important to note that section 53 does more than provide good-faith immunity to 
the coroner or forensic pathologist. It also ensures that the Crown is immune from vicarious 
liability for the acts of that person on its behalf, again so long as good faith cannot be dis-
proved. This result occurs because of the interaction of section 53 of the Coroners Act with the 
Proceedings Against the Crown Act.22 Section 5 of PACA makes the Crown vicariously liable in 
tort for its agents and servants; however, it also precludes Crown liability where those servants 
and agents are not personally liable.23 Thus, section 53 precludes recovery not only from the 
coroner or forensic pathologist, but also from the Crown. This immunity has two key features: 
it requires only good faith, and it applies to a power or duty under the Act.24 
The Coroners Act illustrates the potential uncertainty over the scope of good-faith immunity. 
“Good faith” has been recognized as a term that must be interpreted in its specific context.25 In 
general, “[i]f there is one word that delineates or characterizes the expression „good faith‟, it is 
„honesty‟.”26 In granting summary judgment against a claim asserting bad faith of a pathologist 
acting under the Coroners Act, Justice MacKinnon adopted the following definition of good faith 
from Black’s Law Dictionary:  
a state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one‟s duty 
or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given 
trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advan-
tage.27 
Good faith thus involves honesty or absence of malicious intent. However, a unanimous 2004 
decision of the Supreme Court broadened the circumstances in which an absence of good faith 
can be inferred:  
[T]he concept of bad faith can and must be given a broader meaning that encompasses  
serious carelessness or recklessness. Bad faith certainly includes intentional fault ... Such 
conduct is an abuse of power for which the State, or sometimes a public servant, may be 
held liable. However, recklessness implies a fundamental breakdown of the orderly exer-
                                                 
 21  Ibid. [emphasis added] (Prior to the Coroners Amendment Act, 2009, supra note 9, s. 53 read as fol-
lows: “No action or other proceeding for damages lies or shall be instituted against a coroner or any person 
acting under the coroner’s authority for an act done by him or her in good faith in the performance or in-
tended performance of any power or duty under this Act or the regulations, or for any neglect or default in 
the performance in good faith of any such power or duty” [emphasis added].). 
 22  R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27 [PACA]. 
 23  Ibid. This is a codification of common law: see Peter W. Hogg & Patrick Monahan, Liability of the 
Crown, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2000) at 120 (citing cases from the U.K. and Australia: “Unless such a 
clause expressly preserves the vicarious liability of the Crown, the clause will also immunize the Crown from 
liability”); see also Karen Horsman & Gareth Morley, eds., Government Liability Law and Practice, looseleaf 
(Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2009) at 5.50.10. 
 24  Sossin, supra note 7 at 33; see also Horsman & Morley, ibid. at 5.50. 
 25  McAlpine v. H.(T.) (1991), 57 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 at para. 35, 82 D.L.R. (4th) 609, 7 C.C.L.T. (2d) 113 
(C.A.); R. v. Devereaux (1996), 147 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 108, 112 C.C.C. (3d) 243 at 254 (Nfld. C.A.) [Devereaux 
cited to C.C.C.]. 
 26  Devereaux, ibid. at 255. 
 27  Burns v. Johnston, [2003] O.T.C. 290, [2003] O.J. No. 1452 at para. 26 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) [Burns I] 
quoting Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (Minnesota: West, 1990) at 701, action via 
amended statement of claim dismissed, [2003] O.T.C. 549 (Sup. Ct. J.) [Burns II].  
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cise of authority to the point that absence of good faith can be deduced and bad faith  
presumed. The act, in terms of how it is performed, is then inexplicable and incomprehens-
ible to the point that it can be regarded as an actual abuse of power, having regard to the  
purposes for which it is meant to be exercised.28 
The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently addressed the relationship between the wrongness of 
a decision and bad faith: “[w]hile a wrong decision, even a very wrong decision cannot be 
equated to a decision made in bad faith, a decision may be so clearly wrong on the merits as to 
provide some evidentiary support for a finding of bad faith.”29 Thus good faith is also negated 
by “recklessness” or “serious carelessness”, even in the absence of demonstrable malice, and 
can be questioned where a decision is “clearly wrong”. 
However, a second element must also be met to obtain good-faith immunity: that the  
conduct at issue was in the exercise of a power or duty under the Act. This element of section 53 
has arisen in the context of forensic pathologists. In Burns v. Johnston, at issue was whether a 
pathologist was liable in negligence for providing an oral opinion of cause of death to the police 
before receiving toxicology results. 30 The plaintiff was charged with murder based on that opin-
ion, and the charge was withdrawn when the pathologist later changed the cause of death to drug 
overdose.31 At that time, section 28(2) of the Coroners Act required the autopsy report to be 
made “in writing only to the coroner who issued the warrant, the Crown Attorney, the regional 
coroner and the Chief Coroner.”32 Nonetheless, Justice Manton found that such communication 
between coroners and police was common practice, reasonable, and “necessary if feasible”, and 
thus covered by section 53.33 The Ontario Court of Appeal came to the opposite conclusion in 
Reynolds v. Kingston (City) Police Services Board.34 A murder charge based on a pathologist‟s 
oral report to police was withdrawn after a second autopsy.35 Without mentioning the decision in 
Burns, the Court of Appeal characterized the provision of an oral opinion to police as “[c]ontrary 
to s. 28(2) of the [Coroners] Act.”36  
                                                 
 28  Finney v. Barreau du Québec, 2004 SCC 36, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 17 at para. 39, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 410 [cita-
tions omitted; emphasis added]. An extended version of this passage is quoted in Horsman & Morley, supra 
note 23 at 5.50.20. 
 29  Rosenhek v. Windsor Regional Hospital, 2010 ONCA 13, 257 O.A.C. 283 [Rosenhek], leave to appeal 
refused, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 89, aff‟g [2007] O.J. No. 4486 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL).  
 30  Supra note 27. Note that this case occurred before the class of persons covered by s. 53 was extended 
by the Coroners Amendment Act, supra note 9. However, the change in language does not go to the issues in 
the case. See the previous version of s. 53, supra note 21. For a discussion of s. 53 in the context of the rela-
tionship between the coroner and the police, see Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Beyond the Goudge Inquiry: Is the 
Coroner Part of „The Crown‟ for Stinchcombe Disclosure Obligations?” (2009) 67 U.T. Fac. L. Rev 9 at 31-32. 
 31  Burns II, ibid. at paras. 4, 27. 
 32  Coroners Act, supra note 9, quoted in Burns II, ibid. at para. 29. Note that this part of s. 28 is no 
longer in force after the Coroners Amendment Act, supra note 9. The current s. 29(1) governing the reporting 
of results by the pathologist omits the word “only”: “The pathologist who performed the post mortem exami-
nation of a body under section 28 shall forthwith report in writing his or her findings from the post mortem 
examination and from any other examinations or analyses that he or she conducted to the coroner who issued 
the warrant, the regional coroner and, if the pathologist who performed the post mortem examination is not 
the Chief Forensic Pathologist, the Chief Forensic Pathologist.” It is unclear how this non-exclusive list of per-
sons to whom the report is to be made will affect the recurrence of a challenge parallel to that in Burns. The 
phrase “in writing” may still be interpreted to preclude oral reporting.  
 33  Burns II, ibid. at paras. 30-35. 
 34  2007 ONCA 166, 84 O.R. (3d) 738, 280 D.L.R. (4th) 311 [Reynolds cited to O.R.]. 
 35  Ibid. at paras. 1-6. 
 36  Ibid. at para. 1, referring to the Coroners Act, supra note 9. Note that the pathologist sought to strike 
the statement of claim by asserting the common-law doctrine of witness immunity. The Court found that wit-
ness immunity did not necessarily apply to the pathologist‟s death-investigation functions before his testi-
mony, and the issue would need to be resolved at trial. However, witness immunity is not statutory and so is 
outside the focus of this paper. 
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The matter is further complicated by the research program and policy roundtables of the 
Goudge Inquiry. In his report, Professor Sossin stated that “[t]he third stage of the death investi-
gation consists of the pathologist communicating the results of the autopsy to the coroner (and, 
where appropriate, to the police).”37 He did not elaborate on the meaning of “where appropriate”. 
Mark Sandler, Special Counsel, Criminal Law, framed a panel discussion of the issue as though 
the oral reporting of the tentative findings to the police was accepted as appropriate, and only its 
content and documentation were in issue: 
[A]t the end of the autopsy, the forensic pathologist completes his or her examination and 
then speaks to the police officers. And the question arises: What should the forensic pathol-
ogist be saying to the police at that stage and whether what they‟re saying to the police 
should be captured in writing.38 
While there was consensus around the importance of making a record of these communica-
tions to allow their disclosure to the defense, the oral reporting itself had wide support from 
the police and Crown Attorney panelists.39 Indeed, Commissioner Goudge wrote that the pro-
vision of a preliminary opinion was not “necessarily wrong” and could be useful, although a 
written record of the opinion should be kept.40  
This disagreement over the precise breadth of section 53 of the Coroners Act, specifically 
whether an oral report by the pathologist is allowed, or expected, or mandated, demonstrates a 
critical aspect of statutory immunity for government physicians.41 It also reveals a larger underly-
ing issue. Even if the particular action taken by a government physician is in the performance of 
a power or duty under the relevant legislation, should he or she escape civil liability for taking 
that action negligently? Ultimately, it is preferable for that determination to result not from an 
exercise in statutory interpretation as in Burns, but instead from a normative policy choice. 
Some, but not all, of the regimes governing death investigation in other Canadian jurisdic-
tions have provisions parallel to section 53. In the four provinces with medical examiner  
systems,42 where medical examiners must be physicians and the chief medical examiner must be 
a pathologist, there are no good-faith immunity provisions.43 Other than Ontario, P.E.I. is the 
only jurisdiction in which coroners must be physicians,44 and those coroners also enjoy good-
faith immunity.45 Of the remaining coroner jurisdictions, New Brunswick and the Yukon provide 
no immunity, 46  Saskatchewan, B.C. and Quebec provide good-faith immunity,47  and in the 
                                                 
 37  Sossin, supra note 7 at 14. 
 38  Goudge Inquiry, Transcripts: Roundtables (12 Feb. 2008) at 192, online: IIS7 <http://mail. 
tscript.com/trans/pfp/feb_12_08/index.htm>.  
 39  Ibid. at 205-06, 262-64. 
 40  Goudge Report, supra note 5, vol. 2 at 174-75. 
 41  Sossin, supra note 7 at 34 (uncertainty around the scope of s. 53 contributes to corresponding uncer-
tainty in “the extent to which civil suits may provide an effective forum for accountability and oversight”). 
 42  Under the traditional coroner system, developed in England and imported to Upper Canada prior to 
confederation, coroners were not doctors. In contrast, a defining feature of the medical examiner system of 
death investigation—which originated in the U.S. in the 20th century—was the requirement that medical  
examiners be doctors, usually pathologists. See Randy Hanzlick, Options for Modernizing the Ontario Coro-
ner’s System (Toronto: Goudge Inquiry, 2008) at 5, 16-17, 37-38, online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney 
General <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/policy_research/pdf/Hanzlick_Options-
for-Modernizing.pdf>. 
 43  Fatality Investigations Act, S.N.S. 2001, c. 31, ss. 3-4; Fatality Inquiries Act, C.C.S.M. c. F52, ss. 1- 2; 
Fatality Inquiries Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. F-9, ss. 5, 7; Fatalities Investigations Act, S.N.L. 1995, c. F-6.1, ss. 2-4. 
To be precise, Manitoba provides statutory immunity to the Chief Medical Examiner with regard to the dis-
posal of inquest exhibits, and the provision does not require good faith: Fatality Inquiries Act, C.C.S.M. c. 
F52, s. 33. 
 44  Coroners Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-25.1, ss. 3-4. 
 45  Ibid., s. 53. 
 46  Coroners Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-23; Coroners Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 44. 
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Northwest Territories, and Nunavut, the immunity applies unless the coroner “acted in bad faith 
or without reasonable and probable cause.”48 
B. Medical Officers of Health 
A medical officer of health (“MOH”) or an associate medical officer of health must be a phy-
sician, where physician is defined as “a legally qualified medical practitioner,” with a community 
medicine fellowship or other academic training in public health.49 Furthermore, the Chief Medi-
cal Officer of Health (“CMOH”) and Associate Chief Medical Officer of Health are each required 
to have been a physician for at least five years.50 In addition to these qualifications, every MOH 
has a duty to “keep himself or herself informed in respect of matters related to occupational and 
environmental health.”51 Thus, the qualifications required of an MOH are more extensive than 
those of a coroner. 
The significant powers and duties of MOHs reflect these qualifications. MOHs have a duty to 
inspect or order inspection of their territory, including places used for food storage or service or 
as boarding houses, and have broad powers of entry to do so.52 Obstruction of such an investiga-
tion is an offence.53 Where there is a health hazard, the MOH can require remedial measures.54 
The MOH has the power to seize and destroy “any substance, thing, plant or animal other than 
man” constituting a hazard.55 The MOH also has extensive powers to quarantine individuals or 
classes of individuals, as well as the power to compel their examination or treatment without 
consent.56 If such an order for quarantine, examination, or treatment is not followed, a judge can 
order that person detained for that purpose with the assistance of the police.57 The CMOH has 
significant additional powers to those of the MOHs. If the CMOH certifies “an immediate risk”, 
the Minister can declare any premises a quarantine facility and order any medical supplies 
seized.58 Similarly, the CMOH can require the release of any health records necessary if there is 
“an immediate and serious risk.”59 In case of “an immediate risk”, the CMOH can issue a manda-
tory directive “respecting precautions and procedures” to any health professional or facility.60 
Subsection 95(1) of the Health Protection and Promotion Act (“HPPA”) provides, similarly 
to section 53 of the Coroners Act, as follows:  
No action or other proceeding for damages or otherwise shall be instituted against 
the Chief Medical Officer of Health or the Associate Chief Medical Officer of Health, a 
member of a board of health, a medical officer of health, an associate medical officer of 
health of a board of health, an acting medical officer of health of a board of health or a pub-
lic health inspector or an employee of a board of health who is working under the direction 
of a medical officer of health for any act done in good faith in the execution or the intended 
                                                                                                                                                           
 47  Coroners Act, 1999, S.S. 1999, c. C-38.01, s. 59; An Act respecting the determination of the causes and 
circumstances of death, R.S.Q. 1983 c. R-0.2, s. 16; Coroners Act, S.B.C. 2007, c. 15, s. 62(2). 
 48  Coroners Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. C-20, s. 60. 
 49  Health Protection and Promotion Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.7, as am. by S.O. 2007, c. 10, ss. 1, 64 [HPPA]; 
Qualifications of Boards of Health Staff, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 566, s. 1. 
 50  HPPA, ibid., ss. 81(2), 81.1(3). 
 51  Ibid., ss. 12(1), 81(3). 
 52  Ibid., ss. 10, 41, 43. 
 53  Ibid., ss. 42, 100-101. 
 54  Ibid., s. 13. 
 55  Ibid., s. 19. 
 56  Ibid., s. 22. 
 57  Ibid., ss. 35, 36. 
 58  Ibid., ss. 77.4, 77.5. 
 59  Ibid., s. 77.6. 
 60  Ibid., s. 77.7. 
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execution of any duty or power under this Act or for any alleged neglect or default in the 
execution in good faith of any such duty or power.61 
However, unlike the Coroners Act, the section proceeds to preserve the liability of the Crown 
notwithstanding PACA.62 Similarly, boards of health remain liable.63 Section 95(1) has been 
applied to protect MOHs from liability regarding an alleged failure to address pollution from a 
metal refinery 64  and inspections of a lodging house for the elderly. 65  However, these  
applications of the immunity are very straightforward and provide little material for analysis. 
In particular, none of the SARS cases have involved section 95 immunity.66 
Statutory good-faith immunity in the public health context applies in most Canadian juris-
dictions. The crown and individuals are explicitly immune in Alberta, Quebec, and Saskatche-
wan;67 individuals are immune, and thus the Crown immune, in Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and 
                                                 
 61  Ibid., s. 95(1) [emphasis added]. Note that prior to the 2007 amendment, which followed a recommen-
dation by the Campbell Commission to extend the coverage of this immunity to all public health actors 
(Campbell Report, supra note 3), s. 95 only covered “a member of a board of health, a medical officer of 
health, an associate medical officer of health of a board of health, an acting medical officer of health of a board 
of health or a public health inspector”. 
 62  Ibid., s. 95(1.1); PACA, supra note 22. 
 63  Ibid., s. 95(3). Note that prior to the 2007 amendments, the individuals protected by s. 95(1) were 
most often employees of boards of health and not the provincial government, so Crown liability was not at 
issue—s. 95(3) preserved vicarious liability. The addition of subsection 95(1.1) was necessary to extend the 
preservation of vicarious liability for the new Crown agents, such as the CMOH, added to s. 95(1). Note also 
that protection for MOHs equivalent to s. 95(1) and (3) under the HPPA is found in s. 9(1) and (3) of the 
Mandatory Blood Testing Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 26. However, the MOH has no decision-making role in the 
process other than determining that the application for testing “meets the requirements of the regulations” (s. 
3). Due to the lack of a substantive role for the MOH under the Act, and the absence of case law, these provi-
sions will not be discussed further. 
 64  Pearson v. Inco Ltd., [2002] O.T.C. 515, 33 C.P.C. (5th) 264 at paras. 88-92 (Sup. Ct. J.), aff‟d (2004), 
183 O.A.C. 168, 44 C.P.C. (5th) 276 (Div. Ct.), rev‟d on other grounds (2006), 78 O.R. (3d) 641, 261 D.L.R. 
(4th) 629 (C.A.) (this case was a proposed class action involving the health effects of pollution emitted by the 
refinery, and the MOH was alleged to have failed in her duties to inspect, investigate, and eliminate the rele-
vant health hazards). 
 65  St. Elizabeth Home Society v. Hamilton (City), [2005] O.T.C. 1074, [2005] O.J. No. 5369 at para. 95 
(Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) (this was a complex case in which the Society claimed, among other things, that the MOH 
and the city‟s public health department were negligent in their investigations of complaints about the level of 
care at the home and in their enforcement of the relevant by-laws). 
 66  The SARS cases generally do not involve claims against MOHs, so s. 95 immunity is not at issue: Jamal 
Estate v. Scarborough Hospital - Grace Division (2005), 34 C.C.L.T. (3d) 271, [2005] O.J. No. 3506 (Sup. Ct. 
J.) (QL), rev‟d 2009 ONCA 376, 95 O.R. (3d) 760, 66 C.C.L.T. (3d) 188, leave to appeal refused, [2009] 
S.C.C.A. No. 30 [Jamal Estate]; Henry Estate (Trustee of) v. Scarborough Hospital (2005), 34 C.C.L.T. (3d) 
278, [2005] O.J. No. 3505 (S.C.J.) (QL), rev‟d 2009 ONCA 375, 66 C.C.L.T. (3d) 184, leave to appeal re-
fused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 306 [Henry Estate]; Laroza Estate v. Ontario (2005), 257 D.L.R. (4th) 761, 34 
C.C.L.T. (3d) 264 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), rev‟d 2009 ONCA 373, 95 O.R. (3d) 764, 251 O.A.C. 119 [Laroza Estate]; 
Abarquez v. Ontario (2005), 257 D.L.R. (4th) 745, 34 C.C.L.T. (3d) 249 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), rev‟d 2009 ONCA 
374, 95 O.R. (3d) 414, 252 O.A.C. 267, leave to appeal refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 297 [Abarquez]; see also 
Williams v. Canada (Attorney General) (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 763 at para. 102 (Sup. Ct. J.), rev‟d on other 
grounds, 2009 ONCA 378, 95 O.R. (3d) 401, 249 O.A.C. 150, leave to appeal refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 298 
(at trial Cullity J. noted that “no duties of care or acts of negligence are pleaded against the City‟s Medical Of-
ficer of Health”) [Williams]. For a discussion of the private law duties of care owed by public health authori-
ties and government, see Bernard M. Dickens, “Legal and Ethical Obligations of Public Health Authorities and 
Government” in Commission of Inquiry on Hormone Receptor Testing, “Looking Forward…” Policy Papers, 
vol. 2 (St. John‟s: Newfoundland and Labrador, 2009) at 11-19, online: CIHRT <http://www. 
cihrt.nl.ca/Final%20Report/index.pdf> [Dickens, “Legal and Ethical Obligations”]. 
 67  Public Health Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-37, s. 66.1 as am. by S.A. 2002, c. 32, s. 12(12); Public Health Act, 
R.S.Q. c. S-2.2, s. 123; The Public Health Act, 1994, S.S. 1994, c. P-37.1, s. 68(1). 
84 MCGILL JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH / REVUE DE DROIT ET SANTÉ DE MCGILL [VOL. 4, NO. 2] 
  
 
P.E.I.;68 individuals are immune but the Crown is not immune in B.C. and New Brunswick.69 The 
relevant statute is silent on immunity only in Newfoundland and two of the three territories; the 
recent Public Health Act, 2007 of the Northwest Territories provides individual immunity, but is 
silent on Crown liability.70 Other than the respective provisions regarding the Crown, the only 
variations of any import are that the P.E.I. provision and one of the two B.C. provisions refer to 
bad faith instead of good faith, and the Quebec provision applies only during a “public health 
emergency.”71 
C. Other Physicians Exercising Statutory Powers & Duties 
It should be noted that similar statutory provisions protect physicians at large in their  
exercise of duties mandated by statute. For example, the HPPA creates a duty on doctors (and 
various other health professionals) to report to the MOH if any person they treat “has or may 
have a reportable disease.”72 Section 95(4) provides corresponding good-faith immunity for the 
reporting professional.73 The effective scope of that section is limited, however, as described in 
the recent case of Healey v. Lakeridge Health Corp.:  
I do not find in these provisions, or in the scheme of HPPA as a whole, any implication of a 
legislative intention to relieve physicians and hospitals of liability for negligence in the 
event that, through a want of reasonable care, they fail to diagnose and report a case of TB 
in a timely manner.74 
The Mandatory Gunshot Wounds Reporting Act creates a similar duty to report to the police 
any patient that is treated for a gunshot wound, and provides corresponding good-faith  
immunity. 75 Statutory good-faith immunity is also extended to the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons (and other Colleges), its Council and committees and panels, and the individuals  
acting under their authority, by the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991.76 Thus, doctors 
involved in registration, complaints, discipline, incapacity, and reinstatements are protected.77  
                                                 
 68  The Public Health Act, C.C.S.M. c. P210, s. 106(1); Proceedings Against the Crown Act, C.C.S.M. c. 
P140, s. 4; Health Protection Act, S.N.S. 2004, c. 4, s. 12; Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, 
c. 360, s. 5; Public Health Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. P-30, s. 22.3 as am. by S.P.E.I. 2006, c. 17, s. 3; Crown Pro-
ceedings Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-32, s. 4. 
 69  Public Health Act, S.B.C. 2008, ss. 28, 92; Public Health Act, S.N.B. 1998, c. P-22.4, s. 64. 
 70  Health and Community Services Act, S.N. 1995, c. P-37.1; Public Health and Safety Act, R.S.Y. 2002, 
c. 176; Public Health Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. P-12 (Nu); Public Health Act, S.N.W.T. 2007, c. 17, s. 41. 
 71  R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. P-30, s. 22.3; Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 179, s. 34.1; Public Health Act, R.S.Q. c. 
S-2.2, s. 123. 
 72  Supra note 49, ss. 25, 26. 
 73  HPPA, ibid. 
 74  (2006), 38 C.P.C. (6th) 145 at paras. 62-63, [2006] O.J. No. 4277 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL), Cullity J. [Lak-
eridge Health]. Note that Perell J. has recently granted in the same proceedings a partial motion for summary 
judgment against those persons who were informed of exposure to TB but were not infected: Healey v.  
Lakeridge Health Corp., 2010 ONSC 725 at para. 13, 72 C.C.L.T. (3d) 261 (Sup. Ct. J.) (Perell J. held that the 
hospital had no duty of care to those persons, that there is no compensation available in law for psychological 
injury short of recognizable psychiatric illness, and that such damages would fail for remoteness). 
 75  S.O. 2005, c. 9, ss. 2, 4. 
 76  S.O. 1991, c.18, s. 38.  
 77  Health Professions Procedural Code, being Sched. 2 of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, 
ibid. (and by virtue of s. 4 of that Act, deemed part of the Medicine Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 30); see e.g. Deep v. 
Massel, [2007] O.J. No. 2811 at paras. 17-23 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL), aff‟d 2008 ONCA 4, [2008] O.J. No. 18 (QL). 
Immunity for other administrative and quasi-administrative functions that may be performed by doctors or 
others, beyond the scope of this paper, are found in the Trillium Gift of Life Network Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 
H.20, s. 9, the Independent Health Facilities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.3, s. 38, and the Public Hospitals Act, 
R.S.O. 1990, c. P.40, s. 13. For a discussion of bad faith in the context of a hospital board under the Public 
Hospitals Act, see Rosenhek, supra note 29 at paras. 26-35.  
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Two subtle variations on these schemes of statutory good-faith immunity are “reasonable 
grounds” and “gross negligence”. The Health Care Consent Act provides civil immunity to physi-
cians for treatment in the absence of consent, where there is not only a good-faith belief in  
consent but also reasonable grounds for that belief.78 A similar requirement for immunity is 
found in the Child and Family Services Act, which imposes on physicians, among others, a duty 
to report child abuse or neglect.79 It provides good-faith immunity unless the reporting physician 
“acts … without reasonable grounds for the suspicion.”80 The “gross negligence” variation of 
good-faith immunity is demonstrated by the Good Samaritan Act, 2001 and the Chase 
McEachern Act (Heart Defibrillator Civil Liability), 2007.81 These acts provide civil immunity to 
health professionals giving “emergency health care services or first aid” or using an automated 
defibrillator outside a hospital or equivalent facility in good faith, but only in the absence of 
“gross negligence”.82 These “reasonable grounds” and “gross negligence” variations demonstrate 
that the government is willing to require more than good faith for immunity when it imposes  
obligations on physicians at large. 
II 
GOOD-FAITH IMMUNITY AS A STANDARD LEGISLATIVE PROVISION 
Far from being a unique feature of the health care field or the medical profession, good-faith 
immunity is a standard provision across many legislative regimes in Ontario. As between coro-
ners and MOHs, some regimes cover the actor and the Crown while others protect only against 
personal liability; however, the latter scheme is much more common. For example, the vast  
majority of Ontario government ministries have personal, but not Crown, immunity.83 Equiva-
lent statutory schemes cover many other actors exercising important public functions, including: 
the Building Code and Building Materials Evaluation Commissions, building code officials and 
inspectors;84 firefighters, the Fire Marshal, and the Fire Safety Commission;85 the diagnostic and 
                                                 
 78  Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, s. 29(1). 
 79  R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, s. 72(1)-(3), (5)(a) [CFSA]. 
 80  Ibid., s. 72(7) (The requirement of good faith is expressed as an absence of malice.). 
 81  Good Samaritan Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 2 [Good Samaritan Act]; Chase McEachern Act (Heart Defi-
brillator Civil Liability), 2007, S.O. 2007, c. 10, Sch. N [Chase McEachern Act]. 
 82  Good Samaritan Act, ibid., ss. 1-2; Chase McEachern Act, ibid., s. 2. Section 2 of both Acts also re-
quires the action to be “voluntarily and without reasonable expectation of compensation or reward”. 
 83  Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.16, s. 6; Ministry of Citizenship 
and Culture Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.18, s. 8; Ministry of Community and Social Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 
M.20, s. 4; Ministry of Consumer and Business Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.21, s. 8; Ministry of Correc-
tional Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.22, s. 12 (liability is also precluded “for any act of an inmate, parolee, 
probationer or young person while under his or her custody and supervision”); Ministry of Economic Devel-
opment and Trade Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.27, s. 10; Ministry of Energy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.23, s. 5; Minis-
try of Government Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.25, s. 15 (also covers the Queen‟s Printer for Ontario);  
Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.28, s. 7; Ministry of Labour Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 
M.29, s. 4.1, as am. by S.O. 2006, c. 19, Sched. M, s. 4; Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing Act, R.S.O. 
1990, c. M.30, s. 7; Ministry of Natural Resources Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.31, s. 5; Ministry of Northern  
Development and Mines Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.32, s. 5; Ministry of Revenue Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.33, s. 8; 
Ministry of Tourism and Recreation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.35, s. 9; Ministry of Transportation Act, R.S.O. 
1990, c. M.36, s. 9, as am. by S.O. 2006, c. 19, Sched. T, s. 9; Ministry of Treasury and Economics Act, R.S.O. 
1990, c. M.37, s. 7. Notable examples of Ministry acts that do not provide good-faith immunity include the 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.26; Ministry of the Solicitor General Act, 
R.S.O. 1990, c. M.34; Ministry of the Attorney General Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.17 (the Crown Attorneys Act, 
R.S.O. 1990, c. C.49, s. 14.3(3) provides personal immunity in matters of property relating to criminal  
offences); see also Hogg & Monahan, supra note 23 at 120, n. 56 (the numerical results of a similar survey of 
Ontario ministries conducted as of 2000). 
 84  Building Code Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 23, s. 31. 
 85  Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 4, s. 74. 
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therapeutic X-ray safety Director and inspectors;86 and the Director of the Family Responsibility 
Office.87 Examples of actors immunized under regimes that do not provide for Crown liability are 
the Ontario Health Quality Council 88  and Directors appointed under the Accessibility for  
Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005.89 Furthermore, the immunity provided to the College of 
Physicians and Surgeons under the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 is equivalent to that 
granted to the Law Society of Upper Canada.90 The ubiquity of these provisions suggests that 
they may be accepted as standard legislative features.  
The legislative origins of the immunity provisions in the Coroners Act and the HPPA demon-
strate that they were not the subject of public debate, which suggests an absence of conscious 
policy consideration by legislators. The current section 53 of the Coroners Act was originally in-
troduced in 1978 in The Coroners Amendment Act, 1978 (No. 1.).91 There is no mention of this 
provision in the legislative record.92 On first reading, the Solicitor General described The Coro-
ners Amendment Act as “basically housekeeping amendments required to update the act. 
There‟s no change in the principle of the bill but the amendments will help to clarify some provi-
sions in the Coroners Act and assist the operation of the coroners office in certain areas.”93 More 
recently, the Coroners Amendment Act, 2009 amended section 53 to provide good-faith immu-
nity to all persons acting under the Act, not only coroners and their designates.94 However, the 
legislative history contains no discussion, much less mention, of extending that protection, nor 
of whether good-faith immunity is appropriate for physicians.95 Interestingly, this is despite the 
emphasis on accountability expressed by the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional 
Services on second reading: “The proposed legislation … would … establish the framework 
needed to hold pathologists fully accountable for their work.”96 Also missing in the legislative 
history is any consideration of adding a clause that would maintain Crown liability notwithstand-
ing PACA. The legislative history of section 95 of the HPPA is similar. That provision was  
originally introduced in the Health Protection and Promotion Act, 1983,97 but it was not men-
tioned in any of the corresponding legislative debates.98 Insofar as parliamentary debates dem-
                                                 
 86  Healing Arts Radiation Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.2, s. 26. 
 87  Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, S.O. 1996, c. 31, s. 59. 
 88  Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 5, s. 3. 
 89  S.O. 2005, c. 11, s. 30. 
 90  S.O. 1991, c. 18, s. 38. Cf. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, s. 9. 
 91  S.O. 1978, c. 38, s. 17 [The Coroners Amendment Act], adding s. 44a to The Coroners Act, S.O. 1972 c. 
98.  
 92  First reading: Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 59 (11 May 
1978) at 2394. Second reading: No. 67 (23 May 1978) at 2729-33; No. 68 (23 May 1978) at 2739-55. Commit-
tee of the Whole: No. 79 (6 June 1978) at 3176-93; No. 90 (19 June 1978) at 3620-25. Third reading: No. 90 
(19 June 1978) at 3638.  
 93  Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 59 (11 May 1978) at 2394 
(Hon. George Albert Kerr). 
 94  Coroners Amendment Act, 2009, supra note 9, s. 27, amending s. 53 of the Coroners Act, supra note 
9. 
 95  Ministerial statement & first reading: Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Han-
sard), No. 79 (23 October 2008) at 3537-38, 3539-40. Second reading: No. 97 (2 December 2008) at 4369-
78; No. 98 (3 December 2008) at 4407-14; No. 101 (9 December 2008) at 4569-71. Standing Committee on 
Justice Policy: JP-12 (12 March 2009) at JP-261 - JP-281; JP-13 (26 March 2009) at JP-283 - JP-294; JP-14 
(2 April 2009) at JP-295 - JP-320; JP-15 (9 April 2009) at JP-321 - JP-338. Bill reported as amended: No. 
136 (20 April 2009) at 6085-86. Third reading: No. 155 (28 May 2009) at 7017-26. 
 96  Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. 97 (2 December 2008) at 
4370 (Hon. Rick Bartolucci) [emphasis added].  
 97  S.O. 1983, c. 10, s. 94. 
 98  Ministerial statement & first reading: Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Han-
sard), No. 68 (8 June 1982) at 2435-36, 2452. Second reading: No. 93 (29 June 1982) at 3329-45, 3349-50. 
Committee of the whole: No. 211 (13 February 1983) at 7599-607. Third reading: No. 211 (13 February 1983) 
at 7607-09. 
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onstrate legislative purpose and intention, it is noteworthy that the addition of these provisions 
for government physicians was not mentioned once in the legislature. 
In combination, the ubiquity of good-faith immunity provisions in Ontario legislation and 
the absence of any consideration of the appropriateness of such provisions in the relevant legisla-
tive record of both the Coroners Act and the HPPA suggest that the relevant sections of those 
Acts may be the result of a standard drafting approach, and not of a consideration of the particu-
lar context of government physicians. 
III 
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST GOOD-FAITH IMMUNITY 
In this part, I evaluate the role of statutory good-faith immunity. I begin by assessing the  
historic and current basis for its use. I then turn to the arguments against such use, drawing on 
analyses by the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada in Hill.  
A. Historic and Current Policy Rationales for Good-Faith Immunity 
While Ontario is a useful case study of statutory good-faith immunity, it is not unique or even 
unusual. As Professors Hogg and Monahan have observed, “[m]any statutes contain immunity 
clauses that relieve Crown servants for liability in tort for acts done in good faith in the intended 
execution of their duties.”99 Here I canvass the rationales for this policy. 
Personal liability was historically considered necessary because the Crown was immune, and 
so otherwise the victim would not be able to collect damages.100 Thus, modern Crown liability 
makes personal liability unnecessary.101 The specific rationale for Crown liability is “loss shifting 
or spreading … among those who benefit from its services: the taxpayers.”102 However, due to 
PACA the default effect of providing the public actor with immunity is to provide that same  
immunity to the Crown. Professors Hogg and Monahan describe this as “indefensible as a matter 
of policy, because it leaves the innocent victim without redress.”103 Indeed, they suggest that even 
where the scope of the immunity is framed as one of statutory interpretation, judges may engage 
normative policy considerations by “giv[ing] the immunity clause an artificially narrow interpre-
tation.”104 As noted above, the HPPA immunity regime for MOHs is different from that of the 
Coroners Act, as under the former the government remains liable for the acts of the immune 
physician. On this basis, the statutory immunity provided by the Coroners Act is problematic 
from an equity perspective—the person harmed by the negligence of an MOH has recourse 
against the government, but the one harmed by a coroner or forensic pathologist does not.  
The more enduring reasoning behind immunity for public actors is that liability may have a 
net negative effect on the performance of their duties:  
[A]n effective public administration is best achieved when public officials who are given 
discretionary functions to perform, are free from intimidation of litigation and damages for 
the exercise of that function…. [I]t is better to risk misperformance, albeit in good faith, due 
                                                 
 99  Hogg & Monahan, supra note 23 at 120; see also Horsman & Morley, supra note 23 at 5.50 (who refer 
to “a myriad of provincial statutes”). 
 100  Kurt J.W. Sandstrom, “Personal and Vicarious Liability for the Wrongful Acts of Government Officials: 
An Approach for Liability Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1990) 24 U.B.C. L. Rev. 229 at 262; 
see also Hogg & Monahan, supra note 23 at 117. 
 101  Ibid. 
 102  Sandstrom, ibid. at 261-62. 
 103  Hogg & Monahan, supra note 23 at 120. 
 104  Ibid., citing e.g. Beatty v. Kozak, [1958] S.C.R. 177. Any such covert normative analysis is not apparent 
in Burns, supra note 27, or Reynolds, supra note 34. 
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to no threat of civil responsibility for the misperformance, than to take no action at all 
based on a fear of such responsibility.105 
Note that this concern is also reflected in the common law. For example, in its recent decision 
on malicious prosecution, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of deference to 
prosecutorial discretion: 
[P]rosecutors are vested with extensive discretion and decision-making authority to carry 
out their functions. Given the importance of this role to the administration of justice, courts 
should be very slow indeed to second-guess a prosecutor‟s judgment calls when assessing 
Crown liability for prosecutorial misconduct. Nelles affirmed unequivocally the public  
interest in setting the threshold for such liability very high, so as to deter all but the most 
serious claims against the prosecuting authorities, and to ensure that Crown liability is  
engaged in only the most exceptional circumstances.106  
This inaction due to the fear of litigation is often termed a “chilling effect”.107 Recall that the 
protection under section 95 of the HPPA was extended to a broader class of public servants in 
2007, following the recommendation of the SARS Commission.108 It was once called “naïve” to 
consider civil liability necessary to prevent “malicious or negligent acts”; instead, “deterrence 
should be deferred to the particular institution.”109 Indeed, Professors Hogg and Monahan 
identify the idea “that the government‟s internal disciplinary procedures would be effectively 
employed against incompetent or over-zealous public servants” as an assumption inherent to 
the assertion that civil liability of the individual “is an unpredictable and usually dispropor-
tionately severe penalty.”110  
The adverse impact of tort liability on job performance, including the chilling effect, is often 
cited as a concern for physicians at large as well as medical professionals more generally. The 
potential for liability may influence a physician to do things he would not otherwise do, such as 
run unnecessary tests—“positive defensive medicine”—or not to do things he would normally do, 
such as perform a procedure that commonly attracts malpractice litigation—“negative defensive 
medicine”.111 The latter is a specific application of the chilling effect. The most extreme manifes-
tation of defensive medicine, just as any other chilling effect, is to discontinue a job or not to take 
it in the first place. This would include a practicing physician changing specialities or retiring 
from the profession, or a new physician choosing against certain specialties.112 In his report,  
Liability and Compensation in Health Care, Dean Prichard made the following finding regard-
ing defensive medicine:  
We find some support for the allegation that civil liability claims induce “defensive medi-
cine” but that most of the allegations are exaggerated ... [C]ivil liability claims have caused 
some physicians to take some undue precautions in some circumstances and in some cases 
                                                 
 105  Sandstrom, supra note 100 at 259. See also 263-64.  
 106  Miazga v. Kwello Estate, 2009 SCC 51, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 339 at para. 50 [Miazga], quoting from Proulx 
v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 66, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 9 at para. 4 [Proulx emphasis in Miazga], refer-
ring to Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 [Nelles]. 
 107  See e.g. Hill (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at para. 56.  
 108  Health Systems Improvement Act, 2007, S.O. 2007, c. 10, Sched. F, s. 18; Campbell Report, supra 
note 3, vol. 5 at 19, 65-68. 
 109  Sandstrom, supra note 100 at 265. With the benefit of experience unavailable to Sandstrom in 1990, it 
is instead his view that would now seem naïve. See, for example, the recent revelations of years of serious  
incompetence by pediatric forensic pathologist Dr. Charles Smith: Coroner, “Backgrounder”, supra note 4. 
 110  Hogg & Monahan, supra note 23 at 191, including n. 27. 
 111  Bernard Dickens, “The Effects of Legal Liability on Health Care Providers” in Liability and Compensa-
tion in Health Care: A Report to the Conference of Deputy Ministers of Health (Toronto: University of To-
ronto Press, 1990) app. B, vol. 2, c. 5 at 8 [Dickens, “Prichard Report”]. 
 112  Ibid. at 12-13. 
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to restrict unduly the scope of their practices but … factors other than civil liability also  
contribute substantially to those decisions.113 
Commissioner Goudge specifically discussed the difficulty in attracting physicians to practice 
forensic pathology.114 In addition to “heavy workloads” and “poor remuneration”, he cited  
“severe public scrutiny.” 115  He recommended better funding for training and fellowships,  
opportunities for career advancement, reduced workloads to allow for research and teaching, 
more consistent compensation, more full-time positions, and “state of the art” facilities and 
equipment.116 Notably, he never suggested that scrutiny was unwarranted or standards should 
be lowered; instead, the solution was to address the other factors making the profession unat-
tractive. This is a good example to follow for government physicians in general—if indeed the 
removal of good-faith liability promotes a chilling effect, it can be offset by other means. 
It should be noted that the Ontario Law Reform Commission questioned the long tradition of 
personal immunity for Crown servants in its Report on the Liability of the Crown.117 One basic 
criticism was that the clauses were common but exhibited inconsistency: “there is no rhyme or 
reason to the existing pattern of statutory immunity clauses that are currently scattered through 
a large number of statutes. There are occasional departures from the more standard form of the 
clause and the clause is inexplicably missing altogether from some statutes.”118 The Report also 
criticized statutory immunity from a public law perspective: 
[T]he present law governing liability of the Crown … is opposed to popular and widely-held 
conceptions of government … [T]he government and its officials ought to be subject to the 
same legal rules as private individuals … This is a notion that lies at the heart of the “rule of 
Law” and of “constitutionalism” … [T]he Crown requires some unique powers and immuni-
ties in order to govern effectively ... a long and powerful tradition requires that the scope of 
such powers and immunities should be carefully defined, and should be no broader than is 
necessary ...119  
The Report recommended that all statutory immunity provisions be replaced with an indem-
nity scheme—whether in statute or in contract—which is the mechanism open to most employ-
ers and employees where there is concern of a chilling effect.120  
B. The Rejection of Parallel Policy Rationales by the Ontario Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court of Canada 
While the policy rationale for legislation is typically not the province of the courts, both the 
Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada recently recognized a tort of negligent 
investigation by police.121 The key policy arguments opposing a duty of care owed by police to 
suspects parallel those opposing liability for government physicians acting in good faith. More-
                                                 
 113  Ibid., vol. 1 at 19. 
 114  Goudge Report, supra note 5, vol. 3 at 302-07. 
 115  Ibid., vol. 3 at 302. 
 116  Ibid., vol. 3 at 303-07. 
 117  Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Liability of the Crown (Toronto: Queen‟s Printer for 
Ontario, 1989) [OLRC Report] (Not only was Professor Hogg the research director, but three commissioners 
are particularly noteworthy: Rosalie S. Abella, now Justice Abella of the S.C.C.; J. Robert S. Prichard, then 
Dean of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, and a respected tort scholar; and Earl A. Cherniak, one of 
the province‟s leading litigators.). 
 118  Ibid. at 28 [citations omitted]. 
 119  Ibid. at 2-3. 
 120  Ibid. at 27-29, 33. 
 121  Hill (S.C.C.) and Hill (C.A.), supra note 1. Note that while the S.C.C. split 6:3 on the existence of such a 
tort, the panel of the C.A. was unanimous on its existence and split 3:2 on whether it had been committed in 
the case at bar. 
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over, the roles of government physicians largely parallel those of police. Thus, the Courts‟ rejec-
tion of the arguments against a tort of negligent investigation by police provides an excellent  
basis for the rejection of arguments for good-faith immunity for government physicians. 
In most of their duties and functions, coroners, forensic pathologists, and MOHs are similar 
to police. The core duties of the police include investigating possible offences and “laying charges 
and participating in prosecutions,” as well as “preventing crimes and other offences” and “assist-
ing victims of crime.”122  Outside those functions related to coroners‟ inquests, the coronial  
system functions as investigative agency, comparable to a police force.123 Recall from above that 
coroners investigate unnatural deaths in order to establish “how … when … where … and by what 
means the deceased came by his or her death.”124 In doing so, coroners employ entry, search, and 
seizure powers.125 The forensic pathologist, in performing any autopsy or other analysis ordered 
by a coroner, is an integral part of this investigative apparatus.126 Recall that pathologists often 
provide oral reports to the police.127 If the investigation reveals that the death was not due to 
natural causes, there is a statutory requirement that the Crown Attorney be informed.128 Crown 
Attorneys are explicitly required to consider the information provided by coroners if that  
information may relate to criminal (or provincial) offences.129  
In a similar manner, MOHs essentially function as the public health police with investigative 
and remedial powers. Recall from above that MOHs have a duty to inspect their territory, includ-
ing places used for food storage or service or as boarding houses, and to investigate complaints 
about health hazards.130 They have powers of entry, search, and seizure.131 They exercise broad 
remedial powers to rectify health hazards that include ordering a property cleaned, closed, or  
vacated, or any thing destroyed.132 Several of the matters that may be discovered in the course of 
an investigation constitute offences.133 Where communicable diseases are at issue, MOHs simi-
larly have broad remedial powers that include ordering any property closed or any person to 
submit to medical examination or treatment.134 
Government physicians, as do the police, investigate offences and promote public safety—
like police, often using extensive coercive powers over persons and property to do so. On this  
basis, the decisions in Hill—recognizing a tort of negligent investigation by police—can be  
instructively applied to government physicians. I turn now to those decisions. 
At the Court of Appeal, the major argument against the duty of care was a “chilling effect” on 
police.135 The core of this argument is that civil liability will discourage police from asserting their 
powers for fear of litigation. In his rejection of this assertion as “speculative and counterintui-
tive”, Justice MacPherson explicitly invoked the example of medical professionals: 
                                                 
 122  Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15, s. 42(1)(b)-(c), (e).  
 123  I have made this argument in more detail and for a different purpose elsewhere. See Martin, supra 
note 32 at 31-33. 
 124  Coroners Act, supra note 9, ss. 10, 15, 31(1). 
 125  Ibid., s. 16. 
 126  Ibid., ss. 28-29. 
 127  Rosenhek, supra note 29. 
 128  Coroners Act, supra note 9, s. 18.1 
 129  Crown Attorneys Act, supra note 83, s. 11. 
 130  HPPA, supra note 49, ss. 10, 11. 
 131  Ibid., ss. 19, 41.  
 132  Ibid., ss. 13, 14. 
 133  Ibid., s. 100 (e.g. failure to maintain and operate a food premise in accordance with the regulations, 
sale of diseased food or unpasteurized milk, or failure of the owner of a residential building to provide potable 
water and/or sanitary facilities: ss. 16-18, 20). 
 134  Ibid., s. 22. 
 135  Hill (C.A.), supra note 1 at para. 53. 
[2010]   STATUTORY GOOD-FAITH IMMUNITY FOR GOVERNMENT PHYSICIANS 91 
  
[T]here are legal standards that already govern those investigations - for example, the  
reasonable and probable grounds standard for making an arrest…. Surgeons do not turn off 
the light over the operating room table because they owe a duty of care to their patients. 
They perform the operation, with care.136 
As police are held to “legal standards” in the absence of tort liability, so too are physicians held 
to professional standards enforceable via disciplinary sanctions by the College of Physicians 
and Surgeons.137 Thus, it is equivalently speculative that the same civil liability for negligence 
that other physicians routinely endure would influence the behaviour of government physi-
cians in a way that professional liability does not. Related to the “chilling effect,” and similarly 
rejected by the Court, was the “floodgates” assertion that litigation would unduly occupy the 
police.138 While physicians may resent the time and effort spent defending their actions in 
court, near-total immunity given the low threshold of good faith is a facile and overbroad  
response.  
In rejecting these arguments against a duty of care, the Court also recognized the positive 
dual role of such a duty, a role that would also apply to liability for government physicians: the 
need to balance police powers against the rights of those affected by the police, and the absence 
of an “alternative remedy”.139  The proposition that resort to the College of Physicians and  
Surgeons is an adequate response to erroneous harmful acts by government physicians is weak-
ened by the characterization by Justice MacPherson: “the existence of a public complaints  
process that might result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions is „no alternative to liability 
in negligence.‟”140 Just as the reprimand or suspension of a police officer is no more than moral 
vindication for a complainant, so too is regulatory action against a government physician.141 
The Court of Appeal held that instead of no liability, the correct response to policy concerns 
was “a carefully tailored standard of care”;142 thus, the Court also rejected the additional argu-
ment of the adequacy of malicious prosecution as a cause of action.143 A standard of care incorpo-
rating “normal professional negligence” would be “not overly onerous” for police.144 As it is the 
same standard of care typically applicable to physicians, it would seem similarly appropriate to 
government physicians. The normative argument made by Justice MacPherson was straightfor-
ward and eloquent:  
[a requirement of malice] would set the bar too high … [T]here is another category of police 
misconduct that has the potential to cause serious harm to members of the public … [T]he 
misconduct is anchored in very poor performance of important police duties. It is impor-
tant to give some flesh and blood to this non-malicious category of police misconduct … 
Should Canadian law not provide a cause of action in negligence to people [harmed by neg-
                                                 
 136  Ibid. at para. 63. 
 137  It has been clearly established by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board that coroners and 
pathologists as medical doctors are subject to regulation, including disciplinary action, by the College of Phy-
sicians and Surgeons of Ontario: Sossin, Accountability and Oversight, supra note 7 at 28, quoting Between: 
DM (Complainant) and Charles Randal Smith, M.D. (Member Complained Against) [2000] File #5421. 
 138  Hill (C.A.), supra note 1 at para. 64. 
 139  Ibid. at paras. 68-69. 
 140  Ibid. at para. 68, quoting Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 at para. 60, 
233 D.L.R. (4th) 193. 
 141  See also Tracey Epps, “Regulation of Health Care Professionals” in Downie, Caulfield & Flood, eds., 
Canadian Health Law and Policy, supra note 6 at 75-76, contrasting discipline and civil liability with regard 
to compensation. 
 142  Hill (C.A.), supra note 1 at para. 70. 
 143  Ibid. at paras. 53, 72-81. Note that the elements of malicious prosecution established in Nelles, supra 
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92 MCGILL JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH / REVUE DE DROIT ET SANTÉ DE MCGILL [VOL. 4, NO. 2] 
  
 
ligent police conduct]? Honest reflection about what happened to them suggests only one 
answer.145 
In affirming this reasoning, Chief Justice McLachlin was more concise: “To deny a remedy in 
tort is, quite literally, to deny justice.”146 Justice MacPherson‟s reasoning on malice is similarly 
applicable to government physicians. Statutory good-faith immunity leaves the tort of  
negligence available only where there is bad faith, be it by malice or serious carelessness or 
recklessness.147 There is a whole other “non-malicious category” of misconduct by government 
physicians that is not actionable.148 It “has the potential to cause serious harm to members of 
the public” just as police negligence does.149  
The Court of Appeal recognized key factors that would preclude liability in negligence, but 
held that such factors did not apply to police. The Court cited the propositions of the Supreme 
Court that a duty of care was less appropriate for policy reasons where the action was “in the na-
ture of governmental or legislative policy-making” (as opposed to “operational”) or “in the per-
formance of a quasi-judicial function.”150 Note that these factors do apply to some of the func-
tions of government physicians. For example, a major and publicly visible role of coroners is to 
hold inquests.151 The role of a coroner at an inquest is quasi-judicial, as she essentially sits in 
place of a judge.152 Similarly, a widespread quarantine of a whole class of persons could be a pol-
icy decision, and the CMOH‟s annual report “on the state of public health in Ontario” is partly of 
a policy nature.153 How tort law would apply to these policy or quasi-judicial functions of gov-
ernment physicians will be considered further below. 
                                                 
 145  Ibid. at paras. 75, 77-78, 81. 
 146  Hill (S.C.C.), supra note 1 at para. 35. The extent to which tort law is an efficient mechanism for justice 
is beyond the scope of this paper. In his 1990 Report on Liability and Compensation in Health Care, Dean 
Prichard noted that tort was “a fundamental means of redress for injured patients” (Prichard Report, supra 
note 111, vol. 1 at 21). However, he also found that “only a modest percentage” of those injured by medical 
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 148  Hill (C.A.), supra note 1 at para. 78.  
 149  Ibid. at para. 77. 
 150  Hill (C.A.), ibid. at paras. 67-68, citing Cooper v. Hobart, 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 at paras. 
37-38, 206 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Cooper]. On the policy-operational distinction in the health care context, see 
also Dickens, “Legal and Ethical Obligations”, supra note 66 at 9-11. 
 151  Inquests are governed by the Coroners Act, supra note 9, ss. 10, 15, 18-20, 22.1, 26-27, 30-52.  
 152  Among other things, the coroner determines standing (s. 41), makes any orders to maintain order (s. 
47), administers oaths and affirmations (s. 49), makes orders to prevent abuse of process, limits inappropri-
ate cross-examination, and excludes representatives the coroner finds to be incapable (s. 50). The determina-
tion of whether an inquest is necessary requires a consideration of the public interest as well as the objective 
issue of whether the circumstances of the death are known, and as such may also be regarded as quasi-judicial 
(ss. 20, 31(1)). This is reflected in the sections of the Act that came into force in December 2010, governing com-
plaints about coroners, which specify that the decision whether to hold an inquest and how to schedule it, as well 
as a coroner‟s conduct and decisions at an inquest, cannot be the subject matter of a complaint (s. 8.4(3)). 
 153  HPPA, supra note 49, s. 81(4), as am. by S.O. 2004, c. 30, s. 1(2). A decision to order an individual ex-
amined, treated, and/or isolated is certainly an “operational” one, but the scale at which quarantine becomes 
a policy matter is an issue beyond the scope of this paper. 
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While Chief Justice McLachlin for the majority in the Supreme Court largely affirmed the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeal, she also addressed Justice Charron‟s dissenting argument that 
the proposed duty to suspects was irreconcilable with the established duty to the public.154 The 
tension asserted by Justice Charron between these two duties has an equivalent for government 
physicians. Just as “it is always in the interest of individual members of society to be left alone 
rather than to be investigated by the police,”155 so too is it in that interest not to be considered in 
the causation of a suspicious death by a coroner or pathologist, or not to be inspected or quaran-
tined by an MOH. Thus, as Justice Charron held that “the suspect‟s interest is always at odds 
with the public interest,”156 so too is it for those who are the target of the coercive powers of the 
coroner, pathologist, or MOH. Nonetheless, the “authority to make decisions in the public inter-
est that are adverse to certain citizens” would not be seriously threatened if those physicians 
lacked good-faith statutory immunity, any more than if the police were subject to a tort of negli-
gent investigation—only the ability to do so negligently without repercussion would be  
removed.157 In this regard, Chief Justice McLachlin explained that the conflict between the inter-
est in being left alone and the duty to the public arose because the wrong pair of elements was 
being weighed. The duty to the public “does not conflict with the presumed duty to take reason-
able care toward the suspect … the suspect is a member of the public.”158 What was at issue was 
not “a duty to leave the citizen alone, but only a duty to investigate reasonably.”159 These com-
ments are prescient to the liability of government physicians, as their duties to the public as a 
whole are consistent with, not opposed to, their duties to act without negligence toward particu-
lar members of the public. 
IV 
AFTER GOOD-FAITH IMMUNITY FOR GOVERNMENT PHYSICIANS: 
A RETURN TO THE COMMON LAW OF TORT 
I have discussed above how statutory good-faith immunity is inconsistent with the require-
ment that coroners, forensic pathologists, and MOHs be licensed physicians. It is inequitable 
that government physicians are held to a legislated standard of care that is lower than that  
required of all other physicians by the common law. However, the abolition of this statutory 
good-faith immunity would not mean that all harm done by government physicians would lead 
to liability in negligence. The equality that would result is the equal application of the common 
law of tort, not an equality of outcome. Potentially tortious conduct by government physicians 
and other physicians would both be judged according to the evolving common-law principles of 
tort. For example, as discussed above the role of a coroner in relations to inquests is a quasi-
judicial function that would not incur liability in negligence.160 In this section, I discuss how the 
law of negligence would apply to government physicians if statutory good-faith immunity were 
removed.  
In the absence of statutory good-faith immunity, there will nonetheless be no liability where 
there is insufficient proximity to the harmed individual. The Ontario Court of Appeal has held 
that the high-level prevention of disease and promotion of health is a duty to the public at large 
and not to any particular member of the population. However, this does not preclude all tort  
liability in the public health sphere. 
                                                 
 154  Hill, supra note 1. 
 155  Ibid. at para. 140 [emphasis in original].  
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Justice Sharpe applied this private duty versus public duty distinction in the West Nile Virus 
case of Eliopoulos v. Ontario (Minister of Health & Long Term Care)161 and in the SARS cases. 
In Eliopoulos, a negligence claim against the Ontario government for contracting the virus from 
a mosquito bite was struck as disclosing no cause of action.162 Justice Sharpe held that the plain-
tiffs failed at the first stage of the Anns/Cooper test for a government‟s private duty of care, that 
of foreseeabilty and proximity—even if forseeabilty was assumed, there was no proximity.163 The 
statute created a public law duty but not a private duty: 
[T]hese important and extensive statutory provisions create discretionary powers that are 
not capable of creating a private law duty ... They are not aimed at or geared to the protec-
tion of the private interests of specific individuals. From the statement of purpose in s. 2 
and by implication from the overall scheme of the HPPA, no doubt there is a general public 
law duty that requires the Minister to endeavour to promote, safeguard, and protect the 
health of Ontario residents and prevent the spread of infectious diseases. However, a gen-
eral public law duty of that nature does not give rise to a private law duty sufficient to 
ground an action in negligence.164 
Justice Sharpe also observed that the plaintiffs would have failed at the second stage of the 
Anns/Cooper test, i.e. that residual policy considerations made a private duty problematic.165 
He emphasized the importance of policy discretion at the macro level and implicitly invoked 
chilling-effect concerns: 
[T]o impose a private law duty of care … would create an unreasonable and undesirable 
burden on Ontario that would interfere with sound decision-making in the realm of public 
health. Public health priorities should be based on the general public interest. Public health 
authorities should be left to decide where to focus their attention and resources without the 
fear or threat of lawsuits.166 
Justice Sharpe similarly rejected the claims in the SARS cases.167 In Abarquez he stated: 
“[W]hile Ontario is obliged to protect the public at large from the spread of communicable  
diseases such as West Nile Virus and SARS, Ontario does not owe ... individual residents of the 
province who contract such diseases a private law duty of care giving rise [to] claims for  
damages.”168 From these cases, it is clear there is no private duty of care owed by the government 
to formulate its policies or determine its priorities so as to prevent the infection of specific  
members of the public. 
  
                                                 
 161  (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 321 at paras. 1-3, 276 D.L.R. (4th) 411 (C.A.) [Eliopoulos], leave to appeal refused, 
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 162  Ibid. at paras. 1-3. 
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However, this does not preclude liability where government physicians are negligent in their 
interactions with specific members of the public. In Williams, Justice Sharpe referred to poten-
tial negligence on the part of practicing physicians: 
[T]his result does not leave the plaintiff without a remedy if she can show that she suffered 
harm as a result of negligence at the operational level on the part of those responsible for 
the application and enforcement of the Directives; namely, health care facilities and health 
care professionals.169  
In a similar manner, the improper exercise of powers of treatment or quarantine, or the failure 
to exercise those powers, could constitute negligence by an MOH.170 Similarly, a coroner that 
negligently investigates a particular death such that the wrong person is charged or even  
convicted—or a pathologist that negligently conducts an autopsy to the same effect—could be 
liable to that person.171 
Indeed, Justice Sharpe‟s subsequent decision in Heaslip Estate v. Mansfield Ski Club Inc. 
confirms that the calculus of negligence changes once a particular individual comes to the atten-
tion of the arms of the state.172 Heaslip Estate involved the unavailability of an air ambulance to 
transfer a patient, and the allegation that the province failed to follow its policy for air ambulance 
allocation.173 The motion judge struck out the claim against the province, applying Eliopolous in 
finding only a public duty and not a private duty; likewise, policy considerations, including a  
potential “chilling effect”, would have gone against finding a duty.174 Justice Sharpe, in overturn-
ing that decision, cited Attis v. Canada (Minister of Health) for the proposition that “once the 
government has direct communication or interaction with the individual in the operation or  
implementation of a policy, a duty of care may arise, particularly where the safety of the individ-
ual is at risk”.175 Thus, an MOH that becomes aware of a specific individual that could require 
quarantine, examination, or treatment, and negligently determines which steps are necessary or 
negligently enforces those steps, is in an analogous position. 
These cases are consistent with the recognition of the Court of Appeal in Hill that policy-
making and quasi-judicial functions are generally protected from liability in negligence.176 High-
level governmental decisions made regarding the general protection of the public against  
communicable diseases would likely not create a private duty of care.177 However, that still leaves 
negligence applicable to a substantial range of operational performance regarding the exercise of 
statutory powers in the case of specific individuals. 
                                                 
 169  Williams, supra note 66 at para. 36. 
 170  Perell J.‟s decision in Lakeridge, supra note 74, suggests there would be no liability to persons merely 
exposed, but not infected, by that negligence. 
 171  The Ontario C.A. has held that whether common-law witness immunity covers only the testimony of a 
pathologist, as opposed to the autopsy and the provision of an oral opinion to the police, must be considered 
on the specific facts (Reynolds, supra note 34 at para. 24). Thus, the effect of witness immunity on a negli-
gence claim in the absence of statutory immunity remains to be seen.  
 172  2009 ONCA 594, 96 O.R. (3d) 401, 252 O.A.C. 1 [Heaslip Estate]. 
 173  Ibid. at para. 17. 
 174  Ibid. at paras. 13-14. 
 175  Ibid. at para. 21, citing Attis v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2008 ONCA 660, 93 O.R. (3d) 35, 300 
D.L.R. (4th) 415 at para. 66, leave to appeal refused, [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 491. 
 176  Hill (C.A.), supra note 1. 
 177  See Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228, 64 D.L.R. (4th) 689 [Just]. Justice Sharpe cited 
Just in Heaslip Estate, supra note 172 at para. 21 for the following: “The duty of care alleged here belongs 
within the established category of a public authority‟s negligent failure to act in accordance with an estab-
lished policy where it is reasonably foreseeable that failure to do so will cause physical harm to the plaintiff”. 
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CONCLUSION: AN INEQUITABLE DENIAL OF JUSTICE 
Statutory good-faith immunity for coroners, pathologists, and MOHs is ultimately an inequi-
table denial of justice. The justice provided by tort law should be available to those harmed by 
any negligent physician.178 Government physicians are required by statute to hold valid medical 
licences. The same statutes grant them extensive investigative and coercive powers and so create 
the potential for extensive harm. Nonetheless, they negate the common law competence  
standard of care for physicians with a good-faith requirement for civil immunity. This statutory 
good-faith immunity is common for government employees, and there is no evidence that its  
appropriateness in the special context of government physicians was actively considered during 
the legislative process. The reasoning of the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of 
Canada in recognizing a tort of negligent investigation by police suggests that liability in  
negligence is appropriate where a government employee exerts investigative and coercive powers 
over the individual. In particular, a disciplinary process is no substitute for civil liability, and 
speculation regarding a chilling effect should be given little weight. Moreover, there is no conflict 
of duties in the exercise of powers over the individual in the interests of the general public—the 
public is made up of such individuals. 
There are two levels of changes that would address this inequity. At a minimum, govern-
ments should remove the distinction between those harmed by MOHs and those harmed by 
coroners or forensic pathologists. This would involve amending the immunity provision in the 
Coroners Act so that the government remains liable despite the physicians‟ personal immunity. 
The next level of action would be to remove good-faith immunity provisions from statutes  
governing government physicians. If the government remains concerned about the potential 
chilling effect, it could offset it by other means such as those suggested by Commissioner 
Goudge—better training, compensation, facilities, or equipment. It could also adopt an  
employer-employee indemnity provision as suggested by the OLRC Report—whether in statute 
or contract.179 
The revocation of statutory good-faith immunity would restore the application of the  
common law of tort.180 There would be no liability where there is only a duty to the public at large 
(such as in outbreaks of contagious diseases), or in policy or quasi-judicial matters (such as a 
coroners‟ inquest). However, the duties and functions directed toward specific individuals—
particularly decisions concerning coercive quarantine, examination or treatment, or involvement 
in suspicious deaths—could give rise to liability.  
The Naylor Report, the SARS Commission, and the Goudge Report each made valuable  
recommendations to reduce or prevent future harm in death investigation and public health. In 
their wake, it would be valuable to recognize the state‟s responsibility when such harm nonethe-
less occurs, by restoring Crown liability for the tortious conduct of coroners and pathologists. 
Doing so could indeed improve the quality of death investigation and public health services. 
Ending the Crown‟s PACA-created immunity under the Coroners Act would tend to improve the 
quality of death investigation, as it would no longer be in the state‟s financial interest to dedicate 
insufficient resources to the hiring, training, and supervision of the physicians involved. If the 
                                                 
 178  See supra note 146. 
 179  Indeed, McLachlin C.J.C. in Hill, supra note 1 at para. 59 recognized that such indemnity was common 
in the police context and would reduce the impact of any chilling effect: “[M]any police officers (like other 
professionals) are indemnified from personal civil liability in the course of exercising their professional  
duties, reducing the prospect that their fear of civil liability will chill crime prevention.” See e.g. Police Ser-
vices Act, supra note 122, s. 50. Also see OLRC Report, supra note 117. 
 180  To keep statutory immunity but add a further element of “reasonable grounds” or “gross negligence” 
would be a weak reform. Such standards may be appropriate when the government is imposing requirements 
on all physicians regardless of their expertise, but not where the government is hiring and empowering its 
own physicians on the basis of such expertise. 
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government went further and abolished good-faith immunity for government physicians, tort 
liability might play the same quality-enhancing role it does in health care. 
In closing, it must be noted that there is nothing forcing the government to act. Statutory 
good-faith immunity provisions are certainly not unlawful. The majority of the Supreme Court 
held in 1994 that the legislative choice to limit Crown liability was to be addressed, if at all, at the 
ballot box: “If the Crown wishes to exempt itself from tortious liability … it is a simple matter to 
legislate to that effect, and to leave the propriety of that legislative action for the voters‟  
consideration.”181 The core arguments for change are based on justice and equity. I adopt the  
observation of the OLRC Report—“the answer to the question why the government should  
relinquish many of the advantages that it now enjoys is very simple, yet compelling. It is the right 
and fair thing for good government to do.”182 
                                                 
 181  Swinamer v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 445 at 461, 112 D.L.R. (4th) 18, Cory J. 
(Note that McLachlin J. [as she then was] did not sign on to the majority judgment, but instead wrote a short 
concurring opinion at 449-50. It is difficult to infer from her reasons whether she agreed with the quoted 
statement of Cory J. at that time.). An extended version of this passage is quoted in Horsman & Morley, supra 
note 23 at 5.50.10.  
 182  Supra note 117 at 6. 
